(ABSTRACT (CONTINUED) intensity battle.
The study concludes that both a theoretical and a historical basis exist for the integration of SOF into campaign plans to support the efforts of major conventional forces on the mid -and high -intensity battlefield. However, integration has not been the focus of efforts for improving SOF capabilities in recent years, while the doctrine in FM 100-5 calls for integration and TRADOC PAM 525-34, OPERATIONAL CONCEPT FOR THE EMPLOYMENT OF ARMY SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES, outlines the roles and missions for ARSOF, the educational system has largely ignored the issue. Planners, commanders and staffs must be educated to incorporate SOF into campaign plans. SOF commanders must establish close working relationships with the commanders and staffs to ensure maximum integration is achieved, so that the desired synergistic effect of all arms battle can be achieved.
'This monograph examines the role of the special operations forces as a component of the United States Army war fighting system described by FM 100-5, Operations,; as AirLand Battle Doctrine.
The impetus for this monograph was a lack of recent literary effort examining the relationship between special operations forces and major military operations and campaigns on the mid and high intensity battlefield.
The lack of recent interest by military writers coupled with minimal SOF play in the war games developed at the Combined Arms Center for use by the School of Advanced Military Studies, and a demonstrated lack of understanding of the role of special operations forces as a supporting arm in the global war scenarios played by SAMS students, dictates the need for an examination of this subject.
The monograph explores the theoretical basis for the integration of SOF into campaign plans, establishes a historical basis for the link between SOF operations and the major efforts of conventional forces in the main battle area, and explores current *joint and US Army doctrine for incorporation of SOF into campaign plans for mid-and high-intensity battle. '5-- The study concludes that both a theoretical and a historical basis exist for the integration of SOF into campaign plans to support the efforts of major conventional forces on the mid-and high-intensity battlefield. However integration has not been the focus of efforts for improving SOF capabilities in recent years, while the doctrine in FM 100-5 calls for integration and TRADOC PAM 525-34, OPERATIONAL CONCEPT FOR THE EMPLOYMENT OF ARMY SPE-CIAL OPERATIONS FORCES, outlines the roles and missions for ARSOF, the educational system has largely ignored the issue. Planners, commanders and staffs must be educated to incorporate SOF into campaign plans.
SOF commanders must establish close working relationships with the commanders and staffs to insure maximum integration is achieved, so that the desired synergistic effect of all arms battle can be achieved. "Successful attack will require isolation of the battle area in great depth as well as the defeat of enemy forces in deeply echeloned defensive areas, prompt massing of fires, interdiction of follow-on forces, and the containment and defeat of large formations by fire and maneuver." --FM 100-5 Operations
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INTRODUCTION
The United States armed forces must be prepared to meet the challenge of an enemy who is as well trained as, and better equipped and more numerous than any we have fought in the past.
This study addresses the role of special operations forces in mid and high intensity conflict as an integrated component of a system of fighting defined by current army doctrine as AirLand
Battle. AirLand Battle Doctrine is a logical approach to fighting a joint battle to defeat an enemy who has at his disposal large numbers of well equipped modern forces that can strike across a broad front in sufficient strength to penetrate into our rear, and if not checked achieve decisive results quickly.
AirLand Battle Doctrine seeks to bring combat power to bear at the critical point at the critical time to defeat the enemy, and to be prepared to fight his succeeding echelons. The forces of the rear normally make a supporting effort, in the offense they act as an accelerator to speed up the friendly main effort; in the defense they act as a brake to slow down the enemy's advance; at all times they act to isolate the enemy. (1) The scope of this study is necessarily limited by several factors. First, it is intentionally limited to the integration of army special operations forces, primarily Special Forces, into the campaign plan for mid and high intensity battle. Low intensity conflict is not addressed. While unconventional warfare will be mentioned, it will not receive the attention that direct action intelligence collection and interdiction missions, unilateral missions by army special operations forces (ARSOF) directed against the enemy rear do. This is because the development of an indigenous guerrilla or partisan force and the infrastructure to support them is so time consuming that a modern war in Europe may well be settled before unconventional warfare operations could take effect.
-2- In On War, Clausewitz states:
"There are two reasons for attacking into the enemy's rear, to reduce the ability of an army to sustain itself by cutting its' lines of communications or to encircle an army and cut off its retreat." (5) Clausewitz also recognized that:
"Forces sent to operate against the enemy's rear or flank are not available for use against his front." (6) Thus he recognizes the need for special forces, or at least forces dedicated to operations in the enemy's rear. While
Clausewitz seems to scorn intelligence he does state:
Advance guards and outposts are needed to detect and reconnoiter the enemy's approach before he comes into view. (7) And: An Army must use its vanguard as its strategic eyes, sending out individual detachments, spies and so forth. (8) %
Both are roles consistent with those outlined in FM 100-5
for special operations forces.
Jomini looked at battle in the enemy rear in a somewhat different light than Clausewitz. Jomini allowed that forces operating in the enemy rear could also seize decisive points, and sever
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lines of communications to obtain an advantage in either terrain or relative combat power. (9) Jomini felt that attacking in the enemy's rear could prevent the enemy from concentrating combat power thus achieving greater relative mass at decisive points (10) not unlike our intent to disrupt follow-on echelons.
In Strategy, Liddell Hart addresses flanking and rear attacks in great detail, his primary theme being that:
"Modern armies require constant support from huge military industrial bases in the home territory, conscript armies are too large to feed off the land."(ll)
This implies a weakness or vulnerability to interdiction in the rear, a weakening of sustainment which could bring an army down.
To appreciate fully the potential contribution the integration of special operations in the enemy rear can make to the success of a campaign, it is necessary to look t the doctrine of our primary adversary, the Soviet Union. operations in the enemy's rear area. While they did not specify that special forces need be developed to operate in the enemy rear history has proven that these operations required special training and equipment to insure a high probability of success.
HISTORICAL EXAMPLES
In this study I will examine two major campaigns to trace the role of special operations forces in rear battle, and to determine the impact if any of their actions on the success of the overall campaign. I will also attempt to trace the integration of special operations into the overall campaign plan and the synchronization of these operations with other operations in the campaign. I will then discuss the command and control mechanisms developed to facilitate both integration and synchroniza-* tion.
After the fall of France in June, 1940, and before the invasion of Sicily in July, 1943, war in North Africa was the main effort for the British.
"on the German side, Rommel was sent to Africa to mount a successful holding operation but succeeded in turning a campaign regarded as a side show into a major theater of war." (13) The British Had it succeeded, it would no doubt have contributed greatly to the outcome of the battle. In the event, the aircraft carrying the SAS raiders to their drop zone in the enemy rear got lost in bad weather, several crashed, and a number of the would be raiders were injured.
"The SAS learned three important lessons from the failed raid. First parachutists couldn't take chances with the weather, second units should be self contained, and third that targets might be more easily reached overland with the Long Range Desert Groups." (21)
The SAS commander had direct access to General Auchinleck, the Theater Commander, and his staff in Cairo. Operations throughout the campaign were proposed by Commander SAS, or LRDG, after being briefed on the overall plan by the GHQ staff. While this system did not coordinate special operations with army, corps or division level units, it did integrate the special operations actions into the overall campaign by attacking targets of operational significance. In support of western desert offensive operations between November, 1941, and August, 1942, the SAS destroyed over 400 enemy aircraft on the ground. (22) "Rommel's second offensive, 21 January -7 July 1942 took Benghazi and forced the British back to a defensive line that extended south from Gazala. The initial German advance lasted from 21 January until the British established their weak defense on 4 February. The Germans then paused, re-equipped and trained for four months. March, April and May, 1942, were busy months for the British and Germans alike. Both planned another offensive but first sufficient supplies had to be accumulated for such an operation." (23) The SAS and LRDG did not rest during this period. Their initial attack was against the German port at Boverat in January.
They destroyed seventeen fuel tankers, which exacerbated German problems of petroleum distribution, as well as the local radio For four and one half weeks beginning in mid April the LRDG kept watch twenty four hours a day against the enemy main supply route, logging every tank and vehicle that passed by. This information was invaluable to intelligence in Cairo. (26) During the same period the SAS operated sixteen patrols against the road, this meant that each night three or four raids were conducted against the enemy's main line of communication. (27) Throughout The role and impact of special operations units in the western desert was very significant. While most authors choose to write of deeds as opposed to effects upon the campaign as a whole, it is fair to state that more aircraft were destroyed on the ground by the SAS and LRDG than were destroyed by raids on airfields by the desert air force. Maintenance shops, hangar facilities and spare parts also fell victim to desert raiders.
They interdicted the enemy's main line of communication along its entire length and diverted thousands of enemy solders to guard airfields and secure railway and roads nets. They clearly had a major psychological impact on enemy units. (29) The overall impact of their operations is difficult to assess. It is clear, however, that these operations were integrated into the overall campaign plan by the efforts and initia- -12- In North Africa, the SAS and LRDG coordinated directly with the C in C and his staff. They enjoyed a closeness of cooperation which enhanced integration greatly. The impression that emerges from this study is that the British spirit of "the same officers mess" existed between the senior commander and the junior officers who led the special operations units. This attitude or spirit was not present at Normandy. Special operations types were kept at arm's length. American senior commanders of the time tended not to heed the advice of more junior officers.
While this generalization may not be absolutely valid, enough evidence exists to make it worthy of consideration.
The relationship of the special operations units in North
Africa to conventional main forces operations was personal at the
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The commanders of the SAS and LRDG acted as informal special staff officers for the C in C and assisted his
4'
campaign plan by organizing, planning, and integrating special operations to support the commander's intent. A two-way closeness and reliance developed which seems to have lead to a common effort and easy integration of special operations into the major campaigns they supported.
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The American tendency towards bureauracy seems to have taken 4'hold for Neptune and created a structure which while sound on paper did not seem to function as well as the British system in North Africa when one compares the results of the two campaigns. Only by making a considerable effort across the educational spectrum can we bridge the planning gulf between SOF's traditional place as a theater asset not planned for by the Army and a major supporting force as so well articulated by Otto Heilbrunn, in his work Warfare in the Enemy's Rear.
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